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Abstract.
We ask which economic policies can help a country create the most favourable conditions for
development. We observe that the dynamics of several development indicators can be grouped
into four clusters, each cluster corresponding to a different combination of growth and changes
in inequality. Based on this observation, we define four different development scenarios and use
limited dependent variable regressions to study how structural and policy factors affect a
country’s probability to achieve the most (or the least) favourable of these scenarios. Our results
point to a comforting picture: through the choice of appropriate policies countries can effectively
increase their chances to achieve the most favourable development scenarios.
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1. Introduction
Between 1993 and 2000, South Africa experienced an increase in the poverty headcount
accompanied by a sharp decrease in average life expectancy and a growing proportion of
undernourished children. Similar trends were observed in Ivory Coast, Moldova, Belarus, and
Burundi, just to mention a few countries. Over the same period of time, countries like
Lithuania, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Gambia achieved a significant reduction in monetary
poverty, longer life expectancy, higher rates of immunisation, and lower rates of child
mortality and undernourishment. This large variety of development experiences raises a
simple, albeit crucial, question: to what extent can economic policies help create favourable
conditions for faster development?

In this paper we attempt to provide an answer to this question by exploiting an interesting
feature of the development data. We observe that the dynamics of several development
indicators can be grouped into four clusters, each cluster corresponding to a different
combination of growth and changes in inequality. In this way, we can identify four scenarios
of development. We then use an ordered probit model to study how structural and policy
factors affect the probability of a country ending-up in the most (or least) favourable of these
four scenarios. As discussed in more detail below, this approach has a couple of important
advantages. First, given that the scenarios account for the different dynamics of several
development indicators (and not just one indicator), our approach allows us to study the
conditions for broad development. That is, we look at development in its multidimensionality
and not just at how policies can help improve one specific development indicator. Moreover,
we can do this without having to construct an arbitrary aggregate measure of development.
Second, with the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using
growth and inequality as continuous dependent variables in a single or system equation
estimation. These advantages come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the
categorical dependent variable in our model turns out to be a very strong predictor of
development outcomes, possibly even stronger than the continuous measures of growth and
inequality.

Our main results can be summarised as follows. The probability of a country being in
scenarios that are most favourable to development increases the higher the growth rate of
agricultural productivity, the more rapid the accumulation of human capital, the faster the
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structural transformation of the productive system, and the more widespread access to
infrastructures is. We also find some important structural effects linked to a country’s legal
origin and geographical position. Finally, we provide evidence of the importance of initial
conditions: economies at earlier stages of economic development and initially characterised
by wider inequalities are more likely to end up in a scenario that is more favourable to
development. Taken together, these results highlight what we believe is an important story:
countries are not destined by nature or colonial heritage to remain trapped into
underdevelopment. “Good” policies exist that can help countries achieve scenarios that are
most conducive to a rapid improvement of development indicators.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set our paper in the context of
the existing literature. In section 3 we define and characterise the four scenarios that
constitute the object of our study. Section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5
provides a summary and conclusion. An appendix with detailed material, including data
construction and sources, additional econometric results, and sensitivity analysis is made
available separately.

2. This paper in the context of the literature

This paper relates to the vast literature on the empirical determinants of development
outcomes which consists of several strands. There is of course a well established line of
research that uses per-capita GDP as a proxy for development, thus estimating regression
models in the level of income. Notable examples of this approach include, inter alia,
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Sachs (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), Cartensen and Gundlach (2006),
Nunn (2008), Bhattacharyya (2009), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009). A second avenue of
research estimates single equation regressions of specific development indicators, such as,
the poverty headcount (see, among others, Bourguignon, 2003; Chhibber and Nayyar, 2008;
Loayza and Raddatz, 2008; and Ravaillon and Datt, 2002); mortality, life expectancy, or
some other health indicator (see Powles, 2001; Deaton, 2003; and Cutler, 2006) 1; school
enrolment rates, literacy rates, or related measures of educational attainments (see, inter alia
Carmignani, 2008; Flug et al., 1998; Gupta et al. 2002).
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Even though there is likely to be a positive correlation between different development
dimensions, disaggregate indicators such as those mentioned above are not representative of
development in its multidimensionality. For this reason, a third strand of empirical analysis,
more recent and certainly less voluminous than the previous two, makes use of some
aggregate measure of development as the dependent variable in the regression model. This
practice is indeed facilitated by the availability of a well-known index of human development
(HDI). This index is prepared by the United Nations Development Programme exactly with
the scope to condense different components of a broad notion of development into a single
indicator. While not immune from criticisms, especially with respect to the weighting system
used to aggregate the individual components, the HDI has been used in academic research
(see, for instance, Zgheib et al. (2006) and Constantini and Monni (2008)). An alternative is
suggested by Avom and Carmignani (2008) who aggregate different indicators of health and
education by means of principal components.

In this paper we take a different methodological route to the analysis of the determinants of
development. Instead of measuring development directly, we identify the scenarios that lead
to development (or underdevelopment) and then study the probability of a country ending-up
in anyone of these scenarios. The scenarios arise from the combination of growth and
changes in inequality. We therefore have: (i) scenario one: positive growth and decreasing
inequality, (ii) scenario two: positive growth and increasing inequality, (iii) scenario three:
negative growth and decreasing inequality, and (iv) scenario four: negative growth and
increasing inequality. These scenarios correspond to systematically different dynamics of
several development indicators so that, in fact, they are naturally ordered from most
conducive to development (scenario one) to least conducive to development (scenario four).
Once the scenarios are defined, an ordered probit model will be used to see how different
structural and policy factors affect the probability of a country achieving the most favourable
(or the least favourable) scenario. To this purpose, we construct a categorical variable that
takes values 0, 1, 2, and 3 (the variable equals 0 for observations falling in scenario one,
value 1 for observations falling in scenario two and so on). In this way, we can adopt a rich
specification of the right hand side variables while accounting for the simultaneous
evolvement of growth and inequality. Methodologically, our paper is therefore nested within
the class of models with limited dependent variables that have been analysed in Maddala
(1983).
3

There are important advantages in pursuing this approach. First, we are able to study the
determinants of broad development rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or
indicator. The ordering of scenarios from most favourable to least favourable holds for
several different development measures, including the poverty headcount, child mortality, life
expectancy, malnutrition, immunisation, and female literacy. Therefore, we are not just
running, say, a poverty regression. Instead, by studying what affects the probability of a
country achieving the most favourable scenario, we are in fact studying how policy and
structural factors contribute to the creation of conditions that are conducive to development in
its multiple forms. Equally important is the fact that we are able to do this without having to
aggregate different indicators into a single synthetic measure. We therefore avoid the
complications and arbitrary choices associated with the design of a weighting system that
instead plague the construction of the HDI.

A second advantage of our approach is that it does not require us to model growth and
inequality separately. As pointed out in Lundberg and Squire (2003),

single equation

estimation of growth and inequality is problematic given that the two processes are jointly
endogenous. In this context, system estimation offers a superior alternative by modelling
growth and inequality as the joint outcomes of other variables. But system estimation is not
immune from pitfalls. In fact, the estimation of structural parameters in a system of
endogenous equations requires exclusion restrictions (see Huang et al. 2009). However,
finding theoretically justifiable and meaningful exclusion restrictions is a hard task.
Furthermore, if one equation in the system is misspecified, then the estimates of the other
equations in the system will also be contaminated. In this sense, estimates from 3SLS, or
even SURE, often turn out to be very sensitive to the choice of regressors and identifying
restrictions. Finally, when the equations in the system are simultaneously endogenous,
multicollinearity between any of the endogenous dependent variables and the other regressors
can significantly reduce the precision of coefficient estimates. To deal with these problems,
one might want to adopt parsimonious specifications of the two equations, but this in turn
increases the risk of misspecification. With our approach, instead, we are able to estimate a
rich specification of the right hand side variables while accounting for the simultaneous
evolvement of growth and inequality.
4

Using a categorical variable when continuous variables (in this case growth and changes in
inequality) are available might involve a cost in terms of loss of information. However, we
argue that this cost, in the specific case of our dataset, is not large. We provide three bits of
evidence to support our statement. First, we estimate a standard system of two equations with
growth and inequality as dependent variables (appendix, section A1). While the sign of the
estimated coefficients from the system is generally coherent with the sign of the estimated
coefficients from the ordered probit model, the standard errors tend to be larger in the system.
In other words, the ordered probit model seems to yield more precise estimates. Second, we
show that our categorical variable has a very strong and significant association with
development outcomes. To this purpose, we regress development indicators on the
categorical variable (appendix, section A2). The estimated coefficient of the categorical
variable is always statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and the goodness of fit of the
regression ranges between 0.3 and 0.4. A regression of the same development indicators on
growth and changes in inequality yields similar goodness of fit, with estimated coefficients
that occasionally fail to be significant at the 1 per cent. Moreover, the coefficient of the
categorical variable remains highly significant even when growth and inequality are added to
the regression. Third, as documented in the next section, variation across scenarios explains a
large proportion of total variation in development indicators, growth, and changes in
inequality. This means that explaining why some countries are able to achieve scenario one
while others are not goes a long way towards explaining why some countries develop and
others do not.

3. Scenarios of development

Our dataset consist of a sample of 145 observations covering 71 developing countries. Each
observation is taken over sub-periods of at least five years. For each variable, we measure its
level at the beginning of the relevant sub-period (e.g. the “initial” value) and its annualised
rate of change over the entire sub-period. 2

For any given country c and sub-period t, let yi,t denote the change in per-capita GDP and gc,t
the change in the Gini coefficient. We partition the sample along these two dimensions
according to the following rule:
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-

scenario one: yc,t > 0 and gc,t < 0 (positive growth with decreasing inequality)

-

scenario two: yc,t > 0 and gc,t > 0 (positive growth with increasing inequality)

-

scenario three: yc,t < 0 and gc,t < 0 (negative growth with decreasing inequality)

-

scenario four: yc,t < 0 and gc,t < 0 (negative growth with increasing inequality)

In the full sample of all 145 observations, there are 55 observations that fall in scenario one,
54 in scenario two, 15 in scenario three, and 21 in scenario four.

That a combination of positive growth and decreasing inequality is the best possible scenario
for the reduction of the poverty headcount is a well known result from the poverty literature
(see, for instance, Bourguignon, 2003). In the rest of this section we provide evidence that the
ordering from most favourable (scenario one) to least favourable (scenario four) holds for
various other dimensions of development.

We consider five development indicators in addition to the poverty headcount: child
mortality, life expectancy, child immunisation against DPT, child malnutrition, and female
literacy. The average rate of change of these indicators in the four scenarios is shown in table
1. The table also shows the average rate of growth and change in inequality in each scenario.
In the last column we report the standard deviation of rates of change between scenarios in
per cent of the standard deviation of rates of change in the full sample. This latter statistic is
therefore useful to assess how important variation between scenarios is relative to variation
within scenarios.

SEE TABLE 1 (appendix)

The data in the table confirm that the four scenarios are clearly ordered. Scenario one is most
conducive to development, followed by scenarios two,

three, and

four, respectively.

Scenario four is the least conducive to development. The differences between scenarios are
generally large and statistically significant. In fact, for each indicator, we estimated a
regression of its rate of change in scenario j on a constant and dummies for the other
scenarios. The estimated coefficients from these regressions are equal to the difference in the
rate of change between scenario j and any of the other scenarios. We find that these estimated
coefficients are generally statistically significant at usual confidence levels. 3 The statistics
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reported in the last column also indicate that variation between scenarios on average accounts
for more than half of the total variation in the sample. All in all, it seems that understanding
what drives a country towards any particular scenario is the key to explaining why
development trajectories differ so much across countries.

The data also has interesting implication for the relationship between growth and changes in
inequality. Political economy models often predict a trade-off between growth and
redistribution, thus implying that a scenario of positive growth and decreasing inequality is
difficult to achieve (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994). While
the available empirical evidence on this trade off is ambiguous (see for instance Banerjee and
Duflo, 2003), in our dataset growth and decreasing inequality do not appear to be mutually
exclusive. As just mentioned, one third of total sample observations actually fall in scenario
one and another one third fall in scenario two. Therefore, everything else being equal, a
country going through a period of positive growth is equally likely to experience sharpening
inequalities as it is to experience decreasing inequalities. Moreover, the average rate of
growth in the two scenarios is quite similar, meaning that countries that reduce inequality are
not necessarily penalised in terms of slower growth. In the appendix (section A3), we provide
both parametric and non-parametric evidence confirming that there is no trade-off between
growth and decreasing inequality in our data.

4. Econometric results

Our purpose in this section is to understand what affects a country’s probability to achieve
any of the four scenarios identified in section 3. We go about this task by setting up a
standard ordered probit model. We then design a relatively rich specification of regressors to
represent an array of economic policies and structural factors. Finally, we submit our baseline
results to various checks (some of which are described in more detail in the appendix).

4.1. The model

4.1.1. Econometric setting
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For each generic observation i in the dataset, the dependent variable is coded as follows: si =
0 if the observation falls in scenario one, si = 1 if the observation falls in scenario two, si = 2
if the observation falls in scenario three, and si = 3 if the observation falls in scenario four.
The econometric model therefore takes the form of a multinomial model.

As well known, multinomial models vary according to whether the categories of the
dependent variables are ordered or not. We have argued in sections 2 and 3 that our
dependent variable involves inherently ordered outcomes, going from the most favourable
scenario to the least favourable scenario for development. The probability of observation i
falling in scenario j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) is then defined as:

(1)

β)

β)

where x is a vector of explanatory variables (i.e. the structural factors, initial conditions, and
policy variables included in the dataset), 𝛷 denotes the standard normal c.d.f., and the µs and

the β are parameters to be estimated.

The intuition underlying the ordered probit model (1) is that “conduciveness to development”
is a latent process defined by some interaction between ∆y (changes in per-capita income)
and ∆g (changes in income inequality), which are in turn explained by the vector of variables
x. While the latent process is not observed, the observed values of ∆y and ∆g allow
identifying the four categories of the dependent variable si. In model (1), the stochastic
component of the latent process is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. We also
estimated a model using a logistic distribution and results were not qualitatively different.
Model (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood. The sign of the regression parameters β can
be interpreted in terms of the effect that explanatory variables have on the probabilities: a
positive estimated coefficient on the generic variable xij means that an increase in xij
decreases the probability of being in the lowest category and increases the probability of
being in the highest category.
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4.1.2. Choice and interpretation of explanatory variables

The set of explanatory variables in model (1) includes country fixed effects, initial
conditions, and policy variables (see appendix, section A5 for details on definitions and
sources). Starting with the fixed effects, we control for British legal origin (legor_uk),
distance from equator (lat_abst) and ethnic fragmentation (ethnix). These are time invariant
effects that are likely to be important in determining the quality of governance and
institutions. In turn good institutions should strengthen growth and reduce inequalities. 4 We
therefore expect negative coefficients on both legor_uk and lat_abst and a positive coefficient
on ethnix. Among the country fixed effects we also include a dummy for socialist legal
origins (legor_so). Socialist countries in our sample are peculiar in two respects: (i) they were
characterised for most of the sample period by extremely low inequality, reflecting the
socialist or communist ideology, and (ii) most of them went through a prolonged period of
negative growth and growing inequality in connection with the transition from plan to
market. We thus expect legor_so to display a positive estimated coefficient in our model.

The initial conditions we consider are the initial levels of per-capita income (i_y_pc) and Gini
coefficient (i_gini). The large body of theoretical and empirical work on conditional
convergence suggests that negative growth should be more likely at higher initial levels of
per-capita income. The coefficient on i_y_pc should therefore be positive, even though it is
not entirely clear how a higher initial income could affect the likelihood of reductions in
inequality. An initially higher level of inequality makes the reduction of inequality more
likely, as it is probably easier to lower a Gini coefficient of, say, 60 than a Gini coefficient of,
say, 30. As already discussed, a higher Gini coefficient should not be an obstacle to growth,
so that in the end i_gini is expected to have a negative coefficient.

While time invariant effects and initial conditions are all measured in levels, the remaining
controls are measured as annualised percentage changes. We include three indicators that are
meant to capture the structural transformation of the economy. These are the rate of
agricultural productivity growth (agr_prod), the change in the agriculture share of GDP
(agr_va), and the change in the industry share of GDP (ind_va). In the literature,
industrialization is often seen as the key to growth accelerations. 5 A traditional Kuznets-type
of argument then suggests that this transformation would be accompanied by an increase in
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inequality, at least at the early stages of development. However, it is unclear to what extent a
shift from agriculture to industry effectively leads to persistently higher inequality. In this
respect, our expectation is that the growth effect of changes in sectoral shares is probably
stronger than their distributional effect. The estimated coefficient on agr_va should hence be
negative while the one on ind_va should be positive. At the same, the large weight that the
agricultural sector maintains in many developing economies suggests that productivity
growth in that sector is likely to impact significantly on the growth rate of the economy. To
the extent that it reflects a transition from traditional to modern agriculture, a faster rate of
productivity growth should also be associated with lower inequalities. Consequently,
agr_prod is expected to display a negative coefficient.

The increase in the density of telephone lines (t_comm) and the expansion of the proportion
of irrigated land (irrigated) are meant to capture the dynamics of infrastructure development.
Better infrastructures are expected to foster growth. 6 However, their contribution to the
dynamics of inequality is ambiguous as it is likely to depend on their localisation on the
territory. If governments decide to develop new infrastructures to satisfy the higher demand
expressed by already economically more advanced areas, then the risk is that inequality in the
country will increase. Avom and Carmignani (2008) provide evidence that this negative
distributional effect might be statistically significant. Therefore, the coefficient on t_comm
and irrigated is expected to be negative, but the prediction is somewhat ambiguous.

Finally, the policy environment is represented by the growth rates of four variables: (i) credit
to the private sector (credit), (ii) international trade (trade), (iii) government size (gov_cons),
and (iv) investment in human capital (tyr). All of these variables are quite commonly used in
the applied analysis of growth and inequality. The survey of results presented by Durlauf et
al. (2005) suggest that credit, trade, and tyr should all promote growth, while there is no
consensus on the sign of the effect of gov_cons . A wider access to credit should also help
reduce inequalities. Similarly, an increase in human capital investment is usually regarded as
an improvement in earning opportunities for the population at large, thus implying a
potentially smoother distribution of income. A larger government should also contribute to
reducing inequalities, to the extent that its size correlates with the extent of redistribution. On
the contrary, results in Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Carmignani (2009) indicate that
openness to trade can sharpen inequalities, even though the effect is not necessarily
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statistically strong. Overall, there is no ambiguity about the expected sign of tyr and credit,
which should be positive. On the other hand, for both gov_cons and trade a clear-cut
prediction cannot be made.

4.2. Results

The estimated coefficients of model (1) are reported in table 2. We initially tested for the
potential endogeneity of the regressors by running separate regressions of∆ y and ∆g on the
set of time-invariant effects and initial conditions plus each of the other variables. 7 We
applied the Hausman endogeneity test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993), using lagged values
of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. It turns out that credit, tyr, gov_cons,
and trade are all endogenous to∆ y and/or ∆ g. We therefore use their lagged values in the
estimation of the ordered probit model.

SEE TABLE 2 (appendix)

Column I provides our baseline results. All of the statistically significant coefficients are in
line with our a priori expectations. Among the time-invariant effects, those that matter the
most are geographical location and socialist legal origin. Initial conditions are statistically
very important: a richer country with a lower initial Gini coefficient is less likely to achieve
the most favourable scenario for development. The stage of structural transformation of the
economy also matters: to be conducive to positive growth and declining inequalities, the
transition from agriculture to industry must be accompanied by the modernisation of the
agricultural system and hence by the acceleration of agricultural productivity growth. Finally,
the development of telecommunication infrastructures and the increase in the education level
of the population are also conducive to the achievement of a scenario of positive growth and
declining inequality. 8

In column II we drop the variable tyr, which is not available for all countries in the sample, in
order to maximise the number of observations for estimation. The only noteworthy change
concerns the variable legor_so, which now becomes statistically insignificant. In fact,
education data for socialist countries are not widely available. The regression with tyr
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therefore includes few observations on socialist legal origins and these few observations are
concentrated in the period that corresponds to the transitional recession. The recovery of
several socialist countries, with positive growth and lowering inequalities, towards the end of
the 1990s and the early 2000s is therefore not captured by the estimates in column I.
However, it is captured by the estimates in column II. The fact that in column II the
coefficient of legor_so is not significant can therefore be interpreted of evidence that, outside
the period of the transitional recession, being of a socialist origin does not necessarily push
countries towards an unfavourable development scenario.

In column III we make use of a three-category definition of the dependent variable. The
evidence discussed in section 3 indicates that (i) scenarios are clearly ordered and (ii)
differences between scenarios are statistically significant. Nevertheless, for a couple of
development indicators, the difference between scenarios two and three might not be strong
(see also footnote 3). Therefore, we test the robustness of our results by estimating a model
where the dependent variable has only three categories: 0 for scenario one, 1 for scenarios
two and three, and 2 for scenario four. The results do not dramatically differ from those
reported in column I. However, we do notice that the coefficient on t_comm is now less
precisely estimated. When dropping the variable tyr (estimates available from the authors
upon request) t_comm returns to be statistically significant, while legor_so becomes nonsignificant. All in all, we believe that the core of our results holds true whether four or three
categories are defined for the dependent variable. As a further sensitivity check, in the
appendix (section A4) we also report evidence from a multinomial logit model with
unordered outcomes.

In column IV we estimate the effect of each variable separately on the probability of
achieving (i) positive growth and (ii) lower inequality. The underlying setting is a bivariate
probit model. In practice, we estimate two probit equations: in the first one, the dependent
variable takes value one if the gini indicator decreases (gini_down); in the second equation,
the dependent variable takes value one if growth is positive (y_pc_up). However, we do allow
for correlated disturbances across the two probit equations, much in the same spirit as the
seemingly unrelated regression model for continuous variables. A positive estimated
coefficient now indicates that the regressor increases the probability of reducing inequality or
achieving positive growth.
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The estimates in column IV are useful to understand whether a particular variable plays its
role mainly through the distributional effect (e.g. the effect on the change in inequality) or the
growth effect (e.g. the effect on the change in per-capita income). Interestingly, a few
variables appear to activate both effects. This is the case for agricultural productivity growth
and telecommunication infrastructures. However, while agr_prod increases both the
probability of reducing Gini and the probability of positive growth, t_comm generates effects
of opposite sign. In particular, t_comm increases the probability of ∆ y > 0, but it also reduces
the probability of ∆ g < 0. The estimates reported in columns I and II suggest that in the end
the growth effect dominates, so that t_comm positively contributes to the achievement of a
scenario of growth and decreasing inequality. Of the other variables that are significant in the
aggregate models, most tend to affect the probability of positive growth more than the
probability of lowering inequality. It is however important to stress that, with the exception of
t_comm, none of the variables that promotes a positive growth also increases the likelihood of
higher inequalities. Similarly, none of the variables that increase the probability of gini_down
also decrease the probability of positive growth. Taken together, these findings mean that
growth and decreasing inequality are not mutually exclusive, as long as the appropriate set of
policies and conditions is in place.

Finally, we estimate a simplified specification of the benchmark model that only includes the
statistically significant variables. We perform this exercise both excluding tyr (column V)
and including tyr (column VI) among the regressors. All of the variables retain their sign and
level of statistical significance, thus suggesting that the estimates are not determined by
spurious correlations arising from the inclusion of irrelevant regressors. Note that the results
on legor_so are consistent with the findings from the benchmark specification in column I.
As an additional robustness test (not reported in the table, but available upon request), we
take each of the non-significant variables from column I (or II) and add it, one at a time, to
the simplified specification of column V (or VI). None of these other variables turns out to be
significant. At the same time, the estimated coefficients of the variables of the simplified
specification remain very similar to those reported in the table.
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5. Conclusions

In this paper we are concerned with the contribution of economic policies to the creation of
conditions that are most conducive to development. Our point of departure is the observation
that the dynamics of several development indicators can be clustered in four groups and that
each group corresponds to a specific combination of growth and changes in inequality. We
can then identify four scenarios that are ordered from most conducive to least conducive to
development. We use an ordered probit model to study how policies and structural factors
affect a country’s probability of achieving the most (or least) favourable scenario. This
approach presents a couple of advantages. First, we are able study the determinants of broad
development rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or indicator. Equally
important is the fact that we can do this without having to come up with some arbitrary
procedure to aggregate individual development indicators into a single measure. Second, with
the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using growth and
inequality as continuous dependent variables in single or system equation estimation. These
advantages come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the categorical dependent
variable in our model is a very strong predictor of development outcomes, possibly even
stronger than the continuous variables growth and inequality.

The results point to a comforting picture: good policies help create favourable conditions for
development. In this sense, countries are not condemned to be underdeveloped by initial
conditions, geography, or historical legacies. By implementing the appropriate set of policies,
a country can achieve the scenario of positive growth with declining inequality that provides
the most favourable conditions for sustained development. In this respect, policies promoting
the accumulation of human capital and the development of infrastructures appear to be
particularly beneficial. Supporting the structural transformation of the economy and the
expansion of the industrial sector is also going to play an important role. However, our
findings indicate that while promoting structural transformation, governments should avoid
treating agriculture as a “neglected sector”. In fact, structural transformation should be
accompanied by a process of modernisation of the agricultural system to increase agricultural
productivity.
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Table 1. Characterisation of poverty reduction scenarios

Poverty headcount

Life expectancy

Immunisation DPT

Female literacy

Malnutrition

Child mortality

Per-capita income

Gini

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

-7.57

-2.25

-1.05

16.96

(2.25)

(2.27)

(4.47)

(3.65)

0.43

0.16

-0.29

-0.41

(0.10)

(0.08)

(0.15)

(0.23)

3.85

2.26

-0.03

-3.13

(1.03)

(1.02)

(0.27)

(1.11)

3.17

1.89

1.01

-1.15

(1.31)

(0.14)

(1.12)

(0.28)

-2.11

-1.21

-0.71

0.27

(0.88)

(0.45)

(1.05)

(0.31)

-4.42

-2.75

-1.04

0.98

(0.35)

(0.81)

(0.33)

(0.41)

2.63

2.78

-1.61

-3.73

(0.30)

(0.31)

(0.58)

(0.49)

-1.66

1.69

-2.27

3.76

(0.25)

(0.25)

(0.48)

(0.40)

0.53

0.58

0.64

0.49

0.61

0.47

0.58

0.71

Notes: All the variables are expressed in annualized percentage changes. The number in brackets are the
standard deviations of the estimated α from the following OLS regression:
, where x is the percentage change in a generic development indicator,
i is a generic country and t a generic sub-period, Sj is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the observation falls in
scenario j (where j = 1, 2, 3, 4), and ε is a disturbance.
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Table 2: Regression results
I

II

III

IV

V

Gini_down

Y_pc_up

VI

Legor_uk

0.092

-0.158

-0.120

0.719*

-0.637

..

..

Legor_so

2.719***

0.008

2.319**

-0.130

-5.284***

2.172***

0.413

Lat_abst

-3.311**

-2.868**

-3.578**

2.58

4.272**

-2.944**

-2.636***

Ethnic

-0.548

-0.409

-0.718

1.024

0.0138

..

..

I_yp_c

0.729***

0.397***

0.691***

-0.188

-1.659***

0.623***

0.402***

I_gini

-1.195*

-2.428***

-1.701**

2.080**

0.244

-1.624**

-2.204***

Agr_prod

-0.212***

-.177***

-0.215***

0.134**

0.255***

-0.198***

-0.171***

Agr_va

0.121***

0.108***

0.109**

-0.018

-0.196***

0.122***

0.117***

Ind_va

-0.051

-0.019

-0.052

-0.013

0.142

..

..

T_comm

-0.061**

-0.051**

-0.035

-0.050**

0.234***

-0.0561**

-0.053***

Irrigated

-0.035

-0.048

-0.056

0.107**

-0.007

..

..

Credit

-0.216

0.008

-0.324

0.415*

0.081

..

..

Trade

0.202

0.022

0.182

-0.071

-0.879

..

..

Govcons

-0.529

-0.261

-0.537

0.656

0.943

..

..

Tyr

-1.005***

..

-0.921**

0.071

2.681***

-0.607**

..

Obs.

89

122

89

93

134

90

Notes: Models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are estimated using an ordered probit. Model 4 is estimated by bivariate probit.
To account for possible reverse causality, credit, govcons, trade, and tyr are all lagged. See the appendix for
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variables definition. *, **, *** indicate that estimated coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level respectively.
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Endnotes

The empirical estimation of the determinants of specific health indicators is obviously a main
area of interest in medical science. See for instance Houweling et al. (2005) and Blouin et al.
(2009) for two recent contributions of interest to development economists.
2

The short time series dimension of our panel is due to (i) the limited availability of many

development indicators on a time series basis and (ii) the requirement that percentage
changes be computed over periods of at least five years. The Appendix provides a full
description of sources and details on the construction of the dataset.
3

There are few notable exceptions. Thus, with respect to the poverty headcount and

malnutrition the difference between scenario two and scenario three is not significant. With
respect to female literacy the difference between scenario three and scenario four is not
significant. All of the estimated coefficients are available from the authors upon request.
4

The determinants of institutional quality are analysed by La Porta et al. (1999) and

Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Acemoglu (2008, chapter 22) provide a survey of the
voluminous research on the relationship between institutions and growth. Finally, the effect
of institutions on income inequality is investigated, inter alia, in Carmignani (2009).
5

See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 10).

6

Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), among others, discuss the positive contribution of

infrastructures to growth.
7

Time invariant effects and initial conditions are pre-determined and therefore treated as

exogenous. In the end, we test for the endogeneity of t_comm, irrigated, credit, trade, tyr,
and gov_cons.
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8

The estimated threshold parameters µ for the mode in column I are: µ1 = -4.43 (-9.76, 0.89),

µ2 = -2.94 (-8.25, 2.36), µ3 = -2.14 (-7.46, 3.16). Estimates for the other models are
qualitatively similar and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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